Iran’s New President is A Compendium of Contradictions
Masoud Pezeshkian, who formally takes office today (July 30) as the ninth president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, is not a typical Iranian reformist.
A cardiac surgeon, long-time member of parliament and former minister of health, Pezeshkian, who is of Azeri and Kurdish extraction, is more of a traditionalist in terms of Islamic Republic of Iran elites. At the center of his discourse is a conception of justice that he borrows from Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin of the Islamic prophet Muhammad and the first Shi’ite imam. Pezeshkian frequently cites the Quran and the Nahj al-Balāgha, a collection of letters attributed to Ali, to express a mainly distributive conception of equality.
While the language is reminiscent of the roots of the reformist movement in post-revolutionary Iran, Pezeshkian never formally belonged to the reformist faction, which rose after the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war and the death of Iran’s first leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Rather, Pezeshkian claimed to be an individual outside the usual factions and political organizations within the regime.
The reformist movement is linked to the 1997 presidential candidacy of Mohammad Khatami, a religious intellectual who centered his campaign on promoting, democracy, civil society and political development and promising reforms that would ensure respect for human rights and equality. However, his two administrations (he was re-elected in 2001) failed to deliver on those promises, mainly due to the resistance of Iran’s current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and repressive institutions and factions loyal to the leader.
Pezeshkian’s discourse contrasts with that of the modern wing of reformists, most of whom remain excluded from official politics in Iran and some of who are under house arrest or jailed. For example, compare Pezeshkian’s religious language with that of Saeed Hajjarian, a key proponent of reformism, whose discourse centered on political development and democracy and was enriched by the terminology of Weber and Hobbes, and conceived of justice under the Rawlsian slogan “justice as fairness.”
The same can be said about Pezeshkian’s newly announced vice president, Mohammad Reza Aref, who previously served as vice president in Khatami’s second term. Aref also belongs to the more conservative and conformist wing of the reformists. This helps explain why Khamenei allowed Pezeshkian to run for president and for Aref to be appointed as vice president.
Pezeshkian has called himself a “reformist Principalist” or “Principal reformist,” combining the two main wings in post-revolutionary Iranian politics. It is a leftist version of the “revolutionary” or “jihadi” statesmen that Khamenei has long promoted to the top ranks of the Iranian system.
Most Iranians, including many who boycotted both the first and second rounds of the snap elections called after the death of Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash, saw Pezeshkian as more capable than his chief rival, true hardliner Saeed Jalili. The main source of pessimism about Pezeshkian lies in the structure of the system, which subordinates any Iranian president to the Supreme Leader. The Islamic Republic is not a republic in which directly elected officials hold sway. Rather the president is inferior to the leader and surrounded by conservatives and ideologues who control Iranian national broadcasting, the parliament, a vetting body called the Guardian Council, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and numerous mafia-like unofficial organizations that dominate both politics and the economy.
Additionally, Pezeshkian exhibits contradictions and ambiguity in his social and cultural ideas. He seems to think that he can solve the growing gap between the people and the government within the traditional discourse of the Islamic Republic and that improving the economy will undercut alternative orientations among Iranians.
But it remains unclear how Pezeshkian intends to prove his loyalty to the Supreme Leader while bridging the gap between the government and an angry middle class. Middle-class demands for freedom of speech, internet access, and lifestyle changes as reflected in the 2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protest movement conflict with the interests and policies of the dominant extremist groups.
To fulfill his economic goals, Pezeshkian promises to normalize diplomatic relations with the West and get off the blacklist of the Financial Action Task Force, a global watchdog against money laundering and financing of terrorism. But this would contradict the Islamic Republic’s expansionism in the region and the interests of the economic mafias in Iran.
Pezeshkian’s promise of de-escalation of tensions with the U.S. may also be incompatible with the Islamic Republic’s recent strategic shift toward an alliance with China and Russia.
The key factor here is that, within the legal and real structure of the Islamic Republic, Pezeshkian will have limited power to overcome these contradictions. It is hard to see how he can resolve his internal paradoxes. Even with potent allies like former foreign minister Javad Zarif, he is caught between his promises and the need to obey Khamenei’s commands.
It is possible that the leader will give Pezeshkian leeway to compromise on some of the cultural and social issues that so aggravate ordinary Iranians. But early indications are that Pezeshkian will face significant resistance from various interest groups and well as a tough stance from the West, particularly as conflict within the region continues to radiate out of Gaza.
Ali Afshari is an Iranian biomedical researcher, Middle East analyst, and pro-democracy activist. He is a former student leader and member of the Central Committee of the Office for Consolidation of Unity, the main and largest student organization in Iranian universities during the Reformist era. He got his Ph.D. at George Washington University, working as an adjunct faculty, and contributes regularly on current Iranian political events in Persian and English-language media.
